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Abstract 
The English and Welsh water and sewerage industry is characterised by indivisible capital 
which has a long service life.  Previous studies of efficiency for the English and Welsh water 
and sewerage industry take a static framework, assuming all inputs can be adjusted 
instantaneously. This paper measures dynamic efficiency by incorporating intertemporal links 
of capital within the production function for the English and Welsh water and sewerage 
industry for the period 1997–2011. Dynamic Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) considers 
capital as a quasi-fixed input and is modelled as a contemporaneous output into current 
production and an input from past production. The results show that the inadequate 
intertemporal allocation of quasi-fixed inputs is the largest contributor of inefficiency.  
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1. Introduction1 
The English and Welsh water and sewerage sector is a long-life capital intensive industry, 
characterised by regional monopolies. The industry was privatised in 1989 and is regulated 
by Ofwat (Office of Water Services), the water service regulatory authority which acts as a 
proxy for a competitive market. Ofwat ensures that utility companies obtain  a specified 
return on capital which is unique to the water sector whilst ensuring a competitive price for 
customers. To guarantee quality standards the industry is also regulated by the Drinking 
Water Inspectorate (DWI), National Resources Wales (NRW) and the Environment Agency 
(EA).  
The aims of this paper are twofold: firstly to compare the conclusions from static and 
dynamic DEA highlighting the inefficiencies that arise out of a dynamic framework, and 
secondly to investigate the presence of a preference for capital expenditure known as the 
capex bias. The bias arises because of differing incentive rates between operating and capital 
expenditure, or due to the nature of the industry as much of the infrastructure is built in order 
to meet expected future demand. The presence of the bias drives to the heart of the brief set 
by regulators to guarantee consumer value.  
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used to measure efficiency within a dynamic context 
by examining the presence of quasi-fixed capital. The English and Welsh water and sewerage 
industry is characterised by quasi-fixed inputs such as mains, sewers and treatment works 
which have a long service life and cannot be adjusted to their optimal level instantaneously. 
A dynamic perspective of the measurement of efficiency is required as decisions on quasi-
fixed inputs not only influence current production, but also future production. Intertemporal 
effects are incorporated through the inclusion of capital as an output in the current period 
production as well as an input from the previous period’s production. Firms therefore face a 
trade-off between increasing output today and producing capital to increase outputs in the 
future (Geymueller, 2009). Dynamic DEA determines the optimal allocation of resources 
over the period by minimising dynamic costs given the technology. We allow for overall 
efficiency to be decomposed into a dynamic component and a static component. This 
approach determines the level of efficiency due to variable inputs and the inefficiency due to 
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quasi-fixed inputs. We use a three stage approach by including environmental variables
2
 
within the dynamic framework to ensure firms are compared on a level playing field. Input 
slacks ratios are obtained from the dynamic DEA which are then regressed upon the 
environmental variables. The predicted slack ratios are used to adjust the input variables 
upwards for those firms operating in a relatively favourable environment. The DEA is 
repeated including the adjusted inputs to obtain adjusted efficiency scores accounting for 
differences in the operating environments.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the regulatory 
environment; Section 3 briefly reviews the extant literature; Section 4 outlines the 
methodology to measure dynamic efficiency; Section 5 outlines the sample data and variable 
definitions; Section 6 presents and discusses the results and Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Regulation of the water industry 
The English and Welsh water and sewerage industry in 1989 consisted of ten water and 
sewerage companies (WaSCs) and 29 water only companies (WoCs).  Privatisation has seen 
a series of mergers and acquisitions resulting in ten WaSCs and nine WoCs within the 
industry. The companies are vertically integrated monopolies undertaking all activities of the 
value chain. WaSCs undertake both water and sewerage activities and WoCs only undertake 
water activities. Water services are provided by a single company that extracts, treates, 
distributes and retails the water whereas for sewerage activities a company collects, treats and 
disposes of the sewerage.  WaSCs are considerably larger than WoCs undertaking 78% of 
water supply to the population and serve 85% of the total area of England and Wales (Saal 
and Parker, 2000).  
The local provider of water and sewerage services is a monopoly; therefore Ofwat regulates 
prices through the use of price-cap regulation based on       which allows companies to 
change prices according to the inflation rate (RPI, Retail Price Index) and a K factor 
determined by the regulator. The K factor has two components: a positive component which 
allows for price increases to accommodate large investment programmes and a negative 
component (X-efficiency) which reflects Ofwat’s estimate of the scope for efficiency 
improvements. Ofwat’s determination of the K factor is based on a building block approach 
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to determine the “Required Revenue” which involves the individual assessment of utility 
operating costs, capital charges and return on capital. The first price-cap was set by the 
Government at the start of privatisation in 1989 and subsequent price reviews have been 
undertaken by Ofwat every 5 years in 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009
3
.   
The allowed level of operating costs is determined through the use of yardstick competition 
and menu regulation. Ofwat analyses operating expenditure (opex) and capital expenditure 
(capex) separately. Operating expenditure is subject to an efficiency challenge which is 
decomposed into an industry efficiency challenge for continuing efficiency improvement 
(technical change) and a catch-up factor to the frontier company. The catch-up factor is 
determined through a suite of econometric and unit cost models which are used to calculate 
the company’s relative efficiency. Based upon these efficiency scores firms are banded and 
given an efficiency challenge to catch-up 60% of the difference from the benchmark 
company
4
. Firms are further incentivised to improve efficiency between the five-year price 
reviews, if companies outperform their efficiency challenge the benefits can be kept for the 
five years. Capital expenditure was evaluated through the use of yardstick competition, using 
econometric models and unit costs. In the 2009 price review capex was analysed through the 
use of menu regulation which encourages firms to submit realistic and well evidenced capital 
planning schemes. Ofwat determines an independent baseline, and provides incentives for 
firms to outperform. The companies have the incentive to outperform their efficiency target 
through a symmetric efficiency incentive on the level of over and under spend. The incentive 
rate is based upon the ratio of Ofwat’s baseline and the company’s business plan. Opex is 
recovered within the period; however capex is added to the Regulatory Capital Value (RCV)
5
 
which earns a return based upon Ofwat’s assumptions of the cost of capital. A fair return on 
capital is required to attract investment within the industry.  
The 2014 price review to set prices for 2015–2020 is partly designed around eliminating the 
presence of the perceived capex bias. Ofwat (2011) defines the capex bias as the view that 
companies within the industry have an inappropriate preference for expenditure on capital 
assets over day-to-day operational expenditure. CEPA (2012) state that the bias is believed to 
exist for three reasons. Firstly, there are the different financial incentives created by 
                                                          
3
 The first price-cap in 1989 was set for ten years with an opportunity for the regulator to hold an interim 
determination after five years, which the regulator implemented.  
4
 Ofwat (2008) 
5
 The RCV is the value placed on companies 100 days after privatisation and is rolled forwards based on the 
amount of capital expenditure for each period less the level of depreciation. 
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examining capex and opex separately. Secondly, the presence of what is termed as the 
Averch-Johnson effect; which arises if the allowed rate of return is higher than the true cost of 
capital (Averch and Johnson, 1962). Thirdly, the culture of the sector is one that is focused on 
capex solutions and infrastructure to meet future demand.  
  
3. Literature Review  
The privatisation and regulation of the water and sewerage industry in England and Wales 
has spawned a large literature on estimating productivity and cost efficiency. Ashton (2000) 
analyses firm-specific cost efficiency conditions of WaSCs using a translog variable cost 
function over the period 1987–1997.The paper reports a moderate level of dispersion of 
inefficiency which may be due to the performance or the operating environment within the 
sector. 
Saal and Parker (2000) estimate a cost function to evaluate the impact of privatisation and 
regulation on productivity. The impact of changes in quality regulations were taken into 
account through a quality-adjusted measure of output. The model highlights the importance 
of adjusting for changes in quality standards through the impact on the interaction term 
between water and sewerage activities, finding an improvement in the quality of one output 
may reduce the cost of producing the other. Productivity was examined over the period in 
which the null hypothesis of no productivity change was rejected. Individual parameter 
estimates reveal that the productivity change was led by improvements after the 1994 price 
review and were not due to privatisation. Saal et al (2007) examine technical efficiency 
through an SFA (Stochastic Frontier Analysis) input distance function and find that 
productivity growth was not statistically different after privatisation and the 1994 price 
review. The impact of privatisation and regulation resulted in technological improvements 
rather than efficiency improvements. The average efficiency was lower in 2000 than at 
privatisation; however the price cap has influenced the relatively inefficient firms by 
substantially improving the minimum efficiency score.  
Similarly, Bottasso and Conti (2003) examine efficiency for water activities estimating an 
SFA translog cost function with quasi-fixed capital and confirm that operating inefficiency 
decreased for the period 1995–2001. Bottasso and Conti (2009) examine economies of scale 
and technical change for the WoCs using a variable cost function for 1995–2005. Their 
results on total factor productivity indicate that the rate of technical change is much higher 
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after the 1999 price review in comparison to the rate after the 1994 price review which was 
close to zero. Productivity improvements have been a result of labour saving technological 
progress. 
Saal and Reid (2004) analyse opex productivity growth of the WaSCs from 1993 to 2003 
through the use of a quasi-fixed capital translog cost function. The paper examines the impact 
of the regulatory regime alongside the impact of significant levels of investment to improve 
drinking water quality on opex productivity growth. The results indicate a statistically 
significant improvement in opex productivity growth as a result of the price review in 1994 
but find that the 1999 price review did not produce any additional productivity 
improvements.  
DEA has been applied within the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry
6
  to 
measure the operating expenditure efficiency for the water activities and water distribution 
respectively.  These studies only examine operating expenditure and therefore do not take 
into account capital within their specification. Erbetta and Cave (2007) consider a total cost 
model, for both water and sewerage activities for WaSCs using a four output model. Their 
results highlight that the majority of inefficiencies are due to the incorrect combination of 
inputs: the over-utilisation of labour and the under-utilisation of capital. Over the period 
1993–2005 there was a positive trend for both technical and allocative efficiency. The results 
suggest that the 1999 price review stimulated technical efficiency progress of around 5% 
whereas the 1994 price review had no effect.  
A common theme running throughout the literature of efficiency within the English and 
Welsh water and sewerage industry is the treatment of capital. Capital can be modelled either 
as part of a variable cost function or a long run cost function where the latter assumes that 
firms have the ability to adjust all inputs in the long run to their optimal level. Within the 
variable cost function, capital is incorporated as a quasi-fixed input, therefore capital is not 
considered as a control variable and cost minimisation is only related to variable inputs. Saal 
and Reid (2004) model capital as a quasi-fixed factor as the technology used within the 
industry is indivisible and associated with a long service life and therefore invariant in the 
short-term. In addition, WaSCs face legal obligations to connect customers to the service as 
well as investment programmes agreed with the DWI and EA to meet increasing quality 
standards. Stone and Webster (2004)  and Bottasso and Conti (2009) estimate a variable cost 
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function for the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry and the coefficient on the 
quasi-fixed input implies a tendency of overcapitalisation which is a common finding in the 
literature of public utilities (Caves et al, 1981 and Cowing and Holtman, 1983). Bottasso and 
Conti (2009) state that overcapitalisation can be interpreted as the Averch-Johnson effect due 
to the presence of rate of return regulation alongside the capital intensive nature of the 
industry and the presence of investment to meet future demand.  Stone and Webster (2004) 
and Bottasso and Conti (2009) state that the presence of overcapitalisation could result in a 
misspecified total cost function where the assumption is that firms can instantaneously vary 
the level of capital. Saal and Parker (2000) and Erbetta and Cave (2007) consider a total cost 
function through the use of parametric and non-parametric specifications respectively. 
Erbetta and Cave (2007) find an initial under-utilisation of capital and over-utilisation of 
labour which diminishes over the period. Saal and Parker (2000) report capital-augmenting 
and labour-saving technological change over the period considered. This result is not 
surprising as one of the goals of privatisation was to expand capital investment in the 
industry. Indeed Saal and Parker (2001) examine total factor productivity and find substantial 
capital growth in the post-privatisation period.  
The pioneering work of Farrell (1957) measures efficiency as the distance between an 
observation and an estimated ideal referred to as an efficient frontier. Cooper et al (2007) 
defines DEA as a non-parametric technique which uses mathematical linear programming to 
create a piece wide surface or frontier over the data. Traditionally DEA is studied within a 
static context, therefore inputs and outputs were considered for a given period.  The static 
model implies that all inputs can be adjusted to their optimal level within the given period 
and there are no links between time periods. The Malmquist index allows for the evolution of 
efficiency over time to be measured
7
 and is used to explain changes between two consecutive 
time periods. The Malmquist index allows for the decomposition of the intertemporal 
efficiency change into a catch-up and innovation (frontier-shift) effect.   
The static model is based on the firm’s ability to instantaneously adjust the factors of 
production and ignore the intertemporal linkage of production decisions (Silva and Stefanous, 
2003). However, Emrouznejad and Thanassoulis (2005) make the case for the presence of an 
intertemporal relationship: 1) The existence of a stock of capital whose useful service life and 
the effects of investment extend over several periods; 2) The presence of lagged outputs 
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which, in addition to contemporaneous effect of the inputs, depends on the inputs used in the 
previous periods and 3) The production of intermediate outputs.   
Nemoto and Goto (2003) argue that the assumption of static optimisation results in biased 
measurements of inefficiency if quasi-fixed inputs exist. They show that the allocative 
inefficiency in particular will be overstated to the extent that quasi-fixed inputs are not 
instantaneously adjusted to their optimal levels. The weakness of the static theory of 
production to describe how some inputs gradually adjust has led to the development of 
dynamic models.  
Sengupta (1995) was perhaps the first to introduce dynamics through the adjustment costs of 
quasi-fixed inputs. Fare and Grosskopf (2000) introduce dynamics through the use of 
network DEA considering capital as an intermediate outputs. Nemoto and Goto (1999, 2003) 
propose a model of dynamic DEA using a cost function which is closely related to 
adjustment-cost theory of investment and therefore provides a nonparametric alternative to 
the parametric Euler equation. The model augments the conventional DEA by treating quasi-
fixed inputs at the end of one period as if they were outputs in the period and essentially 
inputs in the subsequent one. The firm therefore faces a trade-off, whether to myopically 
increase output or to increase quasi-fixed inputs to increase future production.  
Geymuller (2009) extend Nemoto and Goto (2003) by solely considering technical efficiency 
in the absence of input prices. Tone and Tsutusi (2010) consider a slacks-based approach 
which considers both radial and non-radial efficiency. Their model allows for the inclusion of 
desirable, undesirable, discretionary (free) and non-discretionary (fixed) variables. The model 
however does not allow for the breakdown of overall efficiency to account for the 
inefficiencies relating to static and dynamic components. Ouellete and Yin (2008) propose a 
dynamic DEA model which allows for the inclusion of quasi-fixed inputs when investment 
decisions are exogenous. Silva and Stefanou (2007) develop a dynamic efficiency model 
which takes into account interdependence of production decisions whilst allowing for 
temporal efficiency measurements. Capital is treated as a quasi-fixed factor and is managed 
as an asset where rapid expansion or contraction of the stock of capital is accompanied by 
adjustment costs. 
The model of Nemoto and Goto (2003) is applied to the English and Welsh water and 
sewerage industry to incorporate the intertemporal nature of capital. Firstly, the capital within 
the industry has a long asset life and span over several periods. Secondly, the firms face a 
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trade-off between the performance in the current period and investing in capital to meet 
future demand and to improve the quality of outputs and productivity.  
4. Methodology 
This section outlines the dynamic DEA model by Nemoto and Goto (2003) which will be 
applied to the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry. Let us have   DMUs 
(       ),   variable inputs (       ),   quasi-fixed inputs (       ) producing   
outputs (       ). The DEA model is shown in equation (1.1) where    is a constant 
discount factor,    denotes the variable inputs used in period  , and    denotes the quasi-fixed 
at the end of period  .         are price vectors of variable inputs and quasi-fixed inputs in 
period   respectively.     denotes the outputs produced in period   and   is a     vector of 
ones to impose the convexity constraint under Variable Returns to Scale (VRS). VRS 
specification is examined to obtain a pure measure of managerial inefficiency excluding any 
scale inefficiencies as WaSCs do not have control over their operating size, unless the 
regulator permits mergers (Thanassoulis, 2000a). Overall efficiency (OE) examines the cost 
minimising level of quasi-fixed and variable inputs given prices whilst incorporating the 
quasi-fixed inputs as an intertemporal factor of production.  
 ̂( ̅ )     {        }    
∑       (  
       
     )  
                                                         
                                                     
                                                                     
                                                             
                                                              
     ̅                                                      (   )   
The bar over the variables represents fixed levels of variables. The difference between this 
DEA model and the static model is the inclusion of the capital stock at time   as an output. 
Nemoto and Goto (2003) highlight that overall efficiency is calculated by: 
    ̂( ̅ )  ⁄       (   ) 
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Here   is the discounted sum of actual costs over the period considered. Overall efficiency 
can be decomposed into dynamic and static efficiency; static efficiency can then be 
decomposed into technical efficiency and allocative efficiency.  Static efficiency is calculated 
holding the quasi-fixed inputs fixed and examining the optimal level of variable inputs given 
input prices. The difference between overall efficiency and static efficiency is dynamic 
efficiency. Static efficiency can be written formally as the linear programming problem in 
equation (1.3) 
       {     }    
∑       (  
       
  ̅   )  
                                                                             
                           ̅                                              
                                 ̅                                                       
                                                                                
                                                                                 
                                           (   )  
Static efficiency (SE) and dynamic efficiency (DE) are then calculated by equation (1.4) and 
(1.5). Dynamic efficiency measures the impact on costs of not using the optimal path of 
quasi-fixed inputs.  
       ⁄       (   ) 
    ̂( ̅ )    ⁄    (   ) 
Nemoto and Goto (2003) highlight that dynamic efficiency includes forecast errors for input 
prices and demands for outputs in the future.  
Static efficiency can be broken down into allocative and technical efficiency. Technical 
efficiency is obtained by examining the radial contraction of variable inputs by solving the 
following linear programming problem: 
       {     }    
∑       (    
  ̅     
  ̅   )  
                 ̅                                          
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                   ̅                                       
                          ̅                                               
                                                               
                                                                
                                           (   )  
The radial contraction    is allowed to vary over the periods. Since the quasi-fixed inputs are 
exogenously given at the actual levels there are no restrictions across the periods. Therefore 
the LP programme can be reduced to T single period problems that are independent of one 
another. Technical efficiency (TE) is measured as  
          
Allocative efficiency (AE) can be calculated as  
            
AE reflects the costs that could be saved if variable inputs were adjusted to the optimal level 
along the short-run isoquant. The relationship for overall efficiency can be decomposed as  
            
The dual of problem 1.1 is:  
  ( ̅ )     
{           }   
 
   
  ̅     ̅  ∑  
   
 
   
 ∑  
 
   
 
           
       
                   
   
      
        
      
     
                       
  
      
       
                   
                                
                                                (   ) 
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The measurement of inefficiency in the period   for variable inputs   
 , for quasi-fixed inputs 
  
  and for net investment in quasi-fixed inputs   
  follows as: 
  
      
 (      
 )  ⁄                   
  
      
 (          
 )  ⁄                           
  
  {(  
         
      )  (  
    
      
      
 )}  ⁄                      (   ) 
 
Where    and    are evaluated at the observed values,   
  and   
  are the optimal values of 
capital and variable inputs at time  .   
  is the marginal adjustment cost at time   derived from 
the dual in equation 1.7.   is the discounted sum of actual total costs over the planning 
period. Positive (negative) values of   
    
  and   
  indicate excess (short) usage of inputs or 
excess (short) net investment. The equations measure the inefficiencies according to the 
normalised deviations of observations along from the optimal input usage.  
Dynamic DEA is compared to static DEA where all inputs are considered as variable 
therefore implying that they can be instantaneously adjusted to their optimal level. Static cost 
efficiency (   ) is obtained by the following linear programme: 
        
        
∑  (  
      
     )
 
   
 
                                 
                             
                          
                       
                                      (   ) 
 
               (    ) 
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Cost efficiency can be decomposed into allocative and technical efficiency by equation 
(1.12). Static technical efficiency (   ) is measured through the following linear 
programme: 
        
     
∑    (  
      
     )
 
   
 
                                   
                               
                          
                       
                                   (    ) 
Static allocative efficiency (   ) is defined as 
          ⁄      (    ) 
A summary of the linear programmes for both dynamic and static DEA are reported in table 1 
which denotes which factors of production are variable, which are exogenous and the action 
required by the linear programme. 
Table 1: Summary of Linear Programmes 
Dynamic Efficiency 
Model 
Variable Factor Exogenous Factors  Action 
Dynamic Overall  -Labour 
-Other inputs 
-Capital 
 Intertemporal 
Readjustment 
Dynamic Static 
Efficiency 
-Labour 
-Other inputs 
-Capital Realignment of input 
mix  
Dynamic Technical 
Efficiency 
-Labour 
-Other inputs 
-Capital Radial contraction 
Static Efficiency Model 
Static Overall 
Efficiency  
-Labour 
-Other inputs 
-Capital 
 Realignment of input 
mix 
Static Technical 
Efficiency 
-Labour 
-Other inputs 
-Capital 
 Radial contraction 
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DEA makes the implicit assumption of homogeneity (Golany and Roll, 1989), implying that 
firms operate within a similar environment. WaSCs operate under different operating 
characteristics which are outside of managerial control, known as non-discretionary or 
environmental variables. Non-discretionary variables can influence the production function, 
increasing or decreasing the maximum attainable output level if the environmental variables 
are favourable or unfavourable respectively. The second part of this paper incorporates 
environmental variables within the dynamic DEA framework through the use of the three 
stage approach based upon Fried et al (1999). The first stage generates the efficiency scores 
and the input slacks. The second stage accounts for the effect of the environmental impact 
upon the slacks through a second stage regression. The third stage adjusts inputs variables to 
create a level playing field before repeating the DEA analysis.  Input variables are adjusted 
upwards for those firms that operate under relatively favourable environments. The firms 
with a relatively unfavourable operating environment have their inputs adjusted by a 
relatively small amount, while those with favourable operating environments are adjusted 
upwards by a relatively large amount. Adjusting the inputs upwards provides a performance 
target managers can reach regardless of their operating environment (Fried et al, 1999). 
Fried et al (1999, 2002) consider the impact of environmental variables on technical 
efficiency while Blank and Valdmanis (2005) extend their work to consider the impact of 
environmental variables on cost efficiency through cost efficiency slacks for each firm and 
time period. The cost slack ratio is the ratio of the optimal input     
  for the  th variable input, 
 th DMU and  th time period and the actual variable input defined by equation 1.13. The cost 
slack ratio for quasi-fixed inputs is defined in equation 1.14 for the  th quasi fixed input,  th 
DMU and  th time period. The cost slack ratios are greater than, less than or equal to 18. A 
value greater than 1 implies an over-utilisation of input, a value less than 1 implies an 
underutilisation of inputs and a value equal to 1 implies an efficient use of inputs.  
      
    
    
       (    ) 
       
    
    
       (    )             
                                                          
8
 Fried et al (1999, 2002) consider both the radial and non-radial slacks whereas this approach only considers 
radial slacks.  
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To determine the impact of environmental variables the input slack ratios are regressed on the 
environmental variables. The slack ratios are centred on their means and do not have a mass 
of observations at one point meaning that this approach avoids the censoring problem when 
using efficiency scores within the second stage regression. To ensure that the predicted slack 
ratios take positive values only a log transformation of the dependent variable is taken.  The 
data for each time period is pooled and regressed upon M environmental variables     
 [         ]                    separately for each input slack
9
.  Simar and Wilson 
(2007) highlight the presence of serial correlation amongst the efficiency scores generated by 
DEA which leads to incorrect inference within the second stage regression. To correct for the 
presence of serial correlation, Simar and Wilson (2007) propose two algorithms. Algorithm 1 
is a bootstrapped truncated regression to provide correct inference. Algorithm 2 is an 
extension to incorporate for the potential bias in non-parametric estimators. By using Monte-
Carlo experiments, the authors conclude that Algorithm 1 overcomes Algorithm 2 in small 
samples (Simar and Wilson, 2007, pp 50-51). To correct for the presence of serial correlation, 
a bootstrap regression is applied to the second stage regression of the environmental variables 
on the input slacks in equation(    )10. 
 
   (    )    
 (     
 )             (                            )       (    ) 
   (     )    
 (     
 )             (                              )    
 
Where   (     
 ) and   (     
 )  are deterministic feasible slack frontiers, parameter 
vectors    and    are to be estimated. The interpretation of the coefficients depends upon 
whether the resource is under or over-utilised. If the resource is over-utilised and takes a 
value greater than 1, a negative coefficient will imply moving to the optimal level of 
resources. However, if the input is under-utilised a negative coefficient will imply that the 
environmental variable is unfavourable, moving away from the optimal utilisation of inputs.  
                                                          
9
 Fried et al (2002) highlight that as the slacks are obtained from the first stage DEA model when considering 
separate equations, the error components are probably not independently and identically distributed (i.i.d). It 
would be preferable to stack the regressions and estimate via SUR allowing the error terms to be correlated 
across inputs. Due to the timing difference within the dynamic DEA this has not be considered here.  
10
 Simar and Wilson (2007) apply a bootstrap truncated regression as the inverse of the Farrell efficiency scores 
are bounded at 1. A bootstrap regression is applied as the cost slack ratios take a value greater than, less than or 
equal to 1. 
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The predicted slacks are obtained and the inputs are adjusted using the methodology of Blank 
and Valdmanis (2005) for each WaSC and time period
11
. The inputs are adjusted upwards 
using equation 1.16 in which the least favourable set of environmental conditions are used as 
a base
12
. 
    
       
  (
     ( ̂   )
 ̂   
)                                   (    ) 
    
       
  (
     (  ̂   )
  ̂   
)                                                  
 
Where   ̂    are the predicted slacks of resource   for firm   at time   and    
  ( ̂   ) 
represents the firm with the most unfavourable conditions. Firms operating within a 
favourable environment have their inputs adjusted upwards by a relatively higher amount 
whereas those with unfavourable environment have their inputs adjusted upwards by a 
relatively lower amount.  The final stage re-runs the dynamic DEA programme using the 
adjusted inputs to control for environmental differences.  
5. Data 
This section describes the data used within the paper and the definitions of the variables 
considered. The data is available for the period 1996/97–2010/11 for the ten WaSCs. WaSCs 
are only considered within the analysis as Saal and Parker (2005) and Bottasso et al (2011) 
highlight that it may be misleading to pool the data for WaSCs and WoCs as they exhibit 
different technologies. Within the panel there were three mergers of WaSCs with the smaller 
WoCs
13
.  
                                                          
11
 Regression for capital slacks is run for the period 1997-2010 as the linear programme does not return an 
optimal value of the capital stock for the end of 1996 and 2011. Using the coefficients obtained, predicted slacks 
are obtained for the end of 1997 and 2011 and capital is adjusted using the same methodology. 
12
 The reciprocal of the ratio from Blank and Valdmanis (2005) is used so the maximum slack, considered as the 
most unfavourable environment is the highest over-utilisation of inputs. Inputs are adjusted upwards by the 
amount in which firms operate under a favourable environment.   
13
 Mergers occurred in April 2000 between Hartlepool Water and Anglian Water, Northumbrian Water and 
Essex and Suffolk Water and finally the merger between Yorkshire Water and York Waterworks. As capital 
from the merged entity is incorporated over time, to avoid the acquisition of capital being treated as investment, 
the data for the pre-merged companies has been aggregated 
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Definition of Variables  
For the application of this methodology for the English and Welsh water and sewerage 
industry, two physical outputs will be considered for water and sewerage activities: water 
delivered and the equivalent population served. To take into account changes in quality 
within the industry the output measures are adjusted by a quality index following Saal and 
Parker (2000). Water output is measured as (  )                    where    is the 
measure of water quality. Water quality is defined as the ratio of the average percentage of 
each WaSC’s water supply zones that are compliant with key water quality indicators as 
defined by the DWI
14
. Sewerage output is measured as (  )                         , 
where    is a measure of sewerage quality. Sewerage quality is accounted for by calculating 
the proportion of the total load receiving secondary treatment. Bottasso and Conti (2003) 
highlight the estimation gains for including not only the physical quantity of outputs but also 
the number of properties served for water and sewerage
15
. However, due to the limited 
number of firms within the dataset, only two outputs have been considered
16
.  
Three inputs are considered within the model: labour, capital and other. Staff costs and the 
number of full time employees are obtained from companies’ statutory accounts. The price of 
labour is calculated as the total labour costs divided by the number for full time equivalent 
employees
17
.  
The value of the capital stock is measured by the MEA (Modern Equivalent Asset) value. The 
MEA value is the estimation of the replacement cost of tangible fixed assets reported for 
water and sewerage services. The frequent revaluations of the MEA value results in arbitrary 
jumps in the measure of capital over time and therefore many authors
18
  have adjusted the 
MEA value in order to smooth out the series for the revaluations.  
                                                          
14
 The average of several key indicators is considered: taste, odour, nitrate, aluminium, iron, lead and pesticides.  
15
 The physical measure of output is applied following Bottasso and Conti (2011). This approaches allows for 
the incorporation of a quality adjusted measure of the physical output.  
16
 A four output model incorporating the number of billed properties for water and sewerage has been estimated 
and the results can be produced upon request. The overall results hold for the four output model, although the 
efficiency scores are higher due to the issue of dimensionality.  
17
 Following Saal and Parker (2000) and Saal et al (2011) this methodology allows for the price of labour to 
vary over time and company. Data from the ASHE (Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings) could be considered 
but due to the lack of regional data, this would mean applying the same price index for all companies.  Staff 
costs were obtained from the statutory accounts rather than the June Return (Erbetta and Cave, 2007) as those 
reported within the June Return only relate to direct labour. This is not a perfect measure as the statutory 
accounts relate to the group activities. Following Stone and Webster (2004) capitalised staff costs were not 
excluded due to a lack of consistency in the company’s reports.  
18
 Saal and Parker (2000, 2001), Saal and Reid (2004), Stone and Webster (2004) and Erbetta and Cave (2007) 
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The methodology for adjusting the capital stock follows that of Saal and Parker (2001), Saal 
and Reid (2004), Stone and Webster (2004) and Erbetta and Cave (2007). The MEA capital 
stock value for the year ending 2009 is used as a starting point and the MEA values are rolled 
forwards and backwards with net investment for each year valued at 2009 prices. Net 
investment is the sum of disposals, additions, investment and depreciation. Following Stone 
and Webster (2004), and others
19
 the series is deflated with the Construction Output Price 
Index (COPI).  
Capital costs are calculated as the sum of depreciation (including IRC
20
) and the opportunity 
cost of capital. The opportunity cost of capital is calculated as the Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital (WACC) applying assumptions made by Ofwat at each price review multiplied by the 
company’s Regulatory Capital Value (RCV). The RCV is an accepted measure of the capital 
stock by Ofwat. The RCV is the value placed on companies 100 days after privatisation and 
is rolled forwards based on the amount of capital expenditure in each period less depreciation 
charges. The capital price is calculated as the capital cost divided by the capital stock. 
Total costs are calculated as the sum of capital costs and operating expenditure net of third 
party services, exceptional items, doubtful debts, service charges and local authority rates
21
. 
Other costs are therefore calculated as total operating costs less labour costs and capital costs. 
Other costs comprise of a composite of other goods and therefore, following Saal et al 
(2011), the price of other goods has been proxied by the price index relating to the price of 
inputs for the distribution and purification of water collected by the ONS. A measure for the 
physical amount of other inputs is calculated as other costs divided by the price of other 
costs.  Following Erbetta and Cave (2007) all costs apart from power costs are deflated using 
RPI to 2009 prices and power is deflated by an energy price index for the industrial sector 
derived from the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI).  
                                                          
19
 Bottasso and Conti (2009) and Erbetta and Cave (2007) 
20
 IRC is the Infrastructure Renewal Charge. This is a charge on infrastructure assets which acts as a 
depreciation.  
21
 These costs are deemed as non-controllable costs by Ofwat and are not incorporated within their assessment 
of efficiency. Exceptional items are by definition atypical. Third party services relate to costs incurred for output 
produced by other companies. Local authority rates and doubtful debts are considered as non-controllable. High 
levels of doubtful debts are due to the legal and regulatory decision of prohibiting the shutting off of water and 
sewerage activities when bills are not paid. Service charges are charges by the Environment Agency for water 
abstraction.  
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The model is a 2 variable input, 1 quasi-fixed input and 2 output model for 10 DMUs per 
period
22
.  
Quality Variables  
Environmental variables are incorporated to control for differences in the operating 
environments faced by the WaSCs and WoCs which allow for those companies that operate 
under a relatively unfavourable (high cost) environment to be analysed on a level playing 
field. The first environmental variable is the proportion of distribution input abstracted from 
rivers to take into account the differences in the resources and treatment (Z1). This allows for 
cost differentials between the different sources (boreholes, river abstraction and reservoirs). 
Abstraction from rivers requires higher treatment costs but fewer abstraction costs. The 
density of a company’s water operations is calculated as the total water population divided by 
the length of mains (Z2). Similarly, sewerage density is calculated by the total sewerage 
population divided by the length of sewers (Z3). It is expected that serving more dense areas 
would be less costly than in rural areas due to additional treatment costs with having 
additional works and serving a sparsely populated density. The level of leakage is controlled 
by calculating the proportion of leakage relative to distribution input (Z4). Erbetta and Cave 
(2007) state that leakage can be a proxy for the quality of the network, therefore the higher 
the proportion of leakage the more critical the condition of the assets. Cherchye et al (2013) 
however state that a higher proportion of leakage might be as a result of a lack of 
maintenance expenditure. Finally, the proportion of trade effluent (Z5) is calculated as the 
volume of trade effluent divided by the volume of waste water returned. A higher proportion 
of trade effluent is likely to incur higher costs, especially with regards to treatment and 
energy costs.  Table 2 presents a snapshot of the data used in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 The model suffers from a dimensionality issue, therefore the efficiency scores are biased upwards, although 
the relative positions stay the same. The paper seeks to examine the relative differences of the inefficiencies 
between variable and capital inputs and the comparison of static and dynamic DEA.  
 20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
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6. Results 
 In the first instance, the results are considered for the implication of modelling dynamic 
versus static DEA. The results from the dynamic DEA allows for the decomposition of 
efficiency into dynamic, static, technical and allocative inefficiencies. The optimality 
conditions and trends for the average efficiency are considered over the period. Secondly, the 
implication of firms operating environments is examined. The results from the second stage 
regression allow for the assessment of whether differing operating characteristics are 
favourable or unfavourable for the firms. Finally, the static and dynamic DEA will be re-
estimated and the results compared against the original DEA to examine the impact on firms’ 
efficiency scores when taking into account their operating environment.   
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Outputs
Water Delivered Ml/Day 1,014.6 551.9 284.2 2,179.4
Equivalent Population (,000) 6,179.8 3,704.1 1,118.4 14,271.9
Water Properties (,000) 1,870.4 979.2 492.9 3,538.8
Sewerage Properties (,000) 2,198.0 1,331.0 586.7 5,426.5
Input Quantities
Capital Stock £m 23,229.9 13,400.8 7,030.2 49,129.9
Employees 2,943.3 1,401.7 1,157.0 5,894.0
Other 184.4 111.4 15.3 491.2
Inputs Prices
Capital Price £ 0.019 0.004 0.010 0.030
Labour Price £m 0.035 0.004 0.024 0.045
Other Cost Deflator 0.782 0.140 0.651 1.052
Operating Characteristics
Water Density 150.893 45.114 100.648 283.411
Sewerage Density 172.001 18.675 131.798 225.861
% of DI from Rivers 0.393 0.203 0.000 0.781
Trade Effluent 0.074 0.035 0.025 0.175
Proportion of Leakage 0.227 0.049 0.147 0.379
Water Quality 0.967 0.026 0.836 0.995
Sewerage Quality 0.904 0.152 0.302 1
Note. 150 Observations. Costs and Input prices are
 expressed in real terms in 2009 prices
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The planning period within the model covers the period 1996/97–2010/11, thus  ̅  
corresponds to the initial capital stock at the beginning of 1997 and    is the terminal capital 
stock at the end of 2011. Table 3 reports the efficiency scores for the whole period calculated 
under variable returns to scale for both the dynamic and static efficiency model. The 
application of a cost function implies input orientation; firms reduce their inputs given the 
amount of outputs. Input-orientation is the assumption mostly considered within the literature 
(Thanassoulis, 2000; Cubbin and Tzanidakis, 1998 and Erbetta and Cave, 2007) as the 
demand level faced by suppliers is exogenous. Overall efficiency (OE) for dynamic DEA can 
be decomposed into static efficiency (SE), technical efficiency (TE), allocative efficiency 
(AE) and dynamic efficiency (DE). The results for the OE reports the efficiency score when 
firms can adjust both variable and quasi-fixed capital whilst taking into account the 
intertemporal nature of capital. Static efficiency within the dynamic context considers the 
efficiency when firms can only consider the reduction of variable inputs and capital is held 
fixed. OE scores range from 77.8% to 100%. The results for the SE are higher than those for 
OE, which indicates that given the level of quasi-fixed inputs firms are between 91.6% and 
100% efficient. Dynamic efficiency is calculated as the ratio of OE and SE. Dynamic 
inefficiency ranges from 0% to 22.3% and these results imply that firms are relatively 
efficient with regards to the variable inputs and that the quasi-fixed inputs are the major 
source of overall inefficiency.  
The static model allows for the contraction of both variable and quasi-fixed inputs without 
taking into account the intertemporal nature of quasi-fixed inputs.     indicate that firms are 
between 73.9% and 100% efficient. These results are all less than or equal to OE but of a 
similar magnitude with the differences ranging between 0 and 5.4%. The     is decomposed 
into     and    , the results show that within the static model the main source of 
inefficiency is due to the wrong factor mix (   ). The relative magnitude of the overall 
efficiency scores under dynamic and static DEA are of a similar magnitude and the ranks 
between the firms do not alter. The dynamic DEA allows for an extension of the static DEA 
to incorporate capital over time and to examine the overall efficiency and efficiency holding 
capital fixed. The results indicate that the firms are relatively efficient with regards to 
variable inputs and the majority of the inefficiencies are due to the over-utilisation of capital 
inputs.  
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Table 3: Dynamic and Static Efficiency Score.  
 
 
 
Figures 1(a-f) demonstrate the deviations over time of the dynamic overall inefficiency 
measured by deviations from the optimality condition   
  and    
  in equation (1.8). Five of 
the firms are showed below; the remaining five are efficient over the whole period and 
therefore do not have deviations from optimality.  
Figure 1a                                                                      Figure 1b 
 
     
 
 
 
OE SE TE AE DE OES TES AES
WaSC1 0.894 0.932 0.938 0.994 0.959 0.870 0.956 0.910
WaSC2 0.778 0.916 1.000 0.916 0.849 0.739 0.992 0.746
WaSC3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC6 0.859 0.965 0.985 0.979 0.890 0.804 0.959 0.838
WaSC7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC8 0.779 0.998 1 0.998 0.781 0.761 0.993 0.767
WaSC9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC10 0.932 0.997 1 0.997 0.935 0.917 0.995 0.922
Dynamic Static
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Figure 1c 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Figure 1d                                                                                       Figure 1e 
 
 
   Figure 1f 
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A common finding is the over-utilisation of capital inputs. The deviations in variable inputs 
from the optimal seem more volatile over the period, whereas quasi-fixed inputs are 
persistently overused. For companies WaSC1 and WaSC2 it can be seen that there has been a 
considerable improvement in the efficiency of variable inputs over the period considered, 
whereas quasi-fixed remain persistently overused.  
The inefficiencies evaluated by   
  are concerned with the allocation of net investment over 
the planning period. Nemoto and Goto (2003) highlight that the distribution over time of net 
investment negatively impacts efficiency depending on the adjustment cost of capital. To 
examine the relationship between the deviation from optimal investment and inefficiency, the 
absolute value of the excess or short investment (   
 ) are plotted against the level of 
inefficiency (  ) in figure 2 for          . The figure shows a positive association 
between the deviation from optimal investment and level of inefficiency. The absolute 
deviation of investment from its optimal level and the inefficiency score has a correlation 
coefficient of 0.3889 which is significant at the 1% level. 
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We now turn to the incorporation of environmental variables within the dynamic DEA. 
Slacks are obtained from the dynamic cost function and the static cost function and are 
regressed upon a number of environmental variables to take into account the impact of 
operating conditions on efficiency. Five environmental variables are considered within the 
analysis, namely water and sewerage density, the proportion of trade effluent, proportion of 
leakage and the proportion of DI from boreholes. Table 4 shows the coefficients and standard 
errors of the regressions:  
Table 4: Slack Regression. Standard errors in parenthesis 
Independent Variable Dependent Variables 
Labour Slack Other Slack Capital Slack 
Intercept -0.6333 
(0.1645) 
-0.6840*** 
(0.2308) 
-0.4360***  
(0.0779) 
Water Density 0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.0028*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002  
(0.0001) 
Sewerage Density 0.0009 
(0.0008) 
0.0063*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0022***  
(0.0004) 
Prop of DI from 0.0302 0.0365 0.0032 
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Rivers (0.0788) (0.1190) (0.0388) 
Prop of leakage -0.6475* 
(0.3425) 
0.6177 
(0.4549) 
-0.0605 
(0.1763) 
Trade Effluent -0.5368* 
(0.3196) 
0.3462 
(0.5041) 
2.4011*** 
(0.2882) 
*** indicates significance at the 1%, ** indicates significance at the 5%, * indicates 
significance at the 10%; total number of iterations= 2,000.  
 
All companies over-utilise the capital inputs but the interpretation of the coefficients for 
labour and other inputs is more complex as some companies over-utilise these inputs whilst 
others under-utilise them. The coefficient for the proportion of DI obtained from rivers for 
capital inputs have a positive coefficient. Capital is over-utilised by firms; the positive value 
would therefore imply that those with a higher proportion of DI from rivers operate under a 
relatively more unfavourable operating condition. Rivers require more power with regards to 
treatment than the other sources of abstraction. The coefficient for water density for capital is 
negative which implies a higher density is favourable; however this result is statistically 
insignificant. On the other hand, the coefficient for sewerage density for capital is positive; 
therefore it implies that operating in an urban environment is unfavourable.  WaSCs with a 
higher proportion of trade effluent operate within an unfavourable operating environment, 
which is indicated through the positive coefficient for capital. This result is intuitive as trade 
effluent may require a higher level of treatment, therefore imposing higher costs upon the 
companies. Leakage has a negative coefficient for capital slacks, which indicates that utilities 
with higher leakage operate under a favourable environment; this may be due to a lack of 
capital maintenance expenditure.  
 
The predicted efficiency scores are generated from the regressions and the actual variables 
are adjusted upwards by the amount in which they operate under a favourable environment 
relative to the most unfavourable using equation 1.16. Summary statistics are reported in 
table 5 for the inputs before and after adjustments for environmental factors. The results 
indicate a higher mean for all input variables and the standard deviation between inputs 
increases when taking into account the differing operating environments.  
Table 5: Environmental Adjusted Data Description   
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The DEA efficiency scores are recalculated with the adjusted data and the dynamic and static 
efficiency results are shown in table 6 below.  
Table 6: Environment Adjusted Dynamic and Static DEA efficiency Scores  
 
 
As with the unadjusted results, the DEA scores highlight the finding that most of the 
inefficiencies are due to dynamic efficiency. The majority of the efficiency scores increase 
when taking into account differences in the operating environment. The incorporation of 
environmental variables increases the average overall efficiency score by 2.4 percentage 
points and the maximum increase is 9.5 percentage points. 
The largest increase in efficiency scores relates to the dynamic component. This implies that 
the environmental variables have the largest effect in equalising the playing field for quasi-
fixed inputs. This is to be expected as a proportion of the differences in companies capital 
will be explained through the differences in the exogenous operating conditions. When 
accounting for the environmental variables there are no changes in the firms’ rankings. 
However the dispersion of efficiency is reduced with the range falling from 22% to 14%. 
 Overall the results indicate that when taking into account intertemporal relationships the 
main contributor to overall inefficiency is the dynamic efficiency. The optimality conditions 
highlight the persistent over-use of quasi-fixed inputs. These results are consistent with those 
Mean Std.Dev Min Max Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Employees 2,943.3 1,401.7 1,157.0 5,894.0 3,268.0 1,586.7 1,241.6 6,812.3
Other Inputs 184.4 111.4 15.3 491.2 237.8 173.9 17.8 877.8
Capital 23,229.9 13,400.3 7,030.2 49,129.9 27,344.0 16,130.7 9,408.2 83,262.7
Initial Resources Adjusted Resources
OE SE TE AE DE OES TES AES
WaSC1 0.889 0.948 0.958 0.990 0.937 0.875 0.960 0.911
WaSC2 0.859 0.958 0.989 0.969 0.897 0.828 0.984 0.841
WaSC3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC6 0.883 0.977 0.991 0.986 0.904 0.844 0.981 0.860
WaSC7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC8 0.874 0.998 1 0.998 0.876 0.863 0.997 0.866
WaSC9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC10 0.976 0.997 0.997 1.000 0.979 0.969 0.998 0.971
Dynamic Static
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of Stone and Webster (2004) and Bottasso and Conti (2009) who also find a presence of over 
capitalisation within the industry. According to Bottasso and Conti (2009) our findings can be 
interpreted as the result of an Averch-Johnson effect. This is due to the presence of rate of 
return regulation, as well as the nature of the industry where infrastructure is built to meet 
future demand.  
When examining the trends of inefficiencies over the period there appears to be an 
improvement of the efficiency of variable inputs, whereas the inefficiencies of capital are 
more persistent. This could be as a result of the differing incentive rates between opex and 
capex and rate of return regulation, which overall indicate a presence of a capex bias. The 
inclusion of environmental variables allows firms to be considered when taking into account 
differences in the operating environment. The inclusion of environmental variables increases 
the majority of efficiency scores; however the ranks do not change amongst firms. The 
inclusion of environmental variables dampens the magnitude of the perceived capex bias.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper has evaluated the effect of dynamic DEA in the English and Welsh water and 
sewerage industry. A two output model has been constructed for the ten WaSCs within the 
industry for the period 1996/97–2010/11. Environmental variables have been considered 
within the analysis in order to account for those firms that operate under relatively favourable 
or unfavourable environments.  
The estimates show that the main estimated inefficiencies are due to the quasi-fixed inputs. 
The overall first stage inefficiencies within the industry range from 0 to 22.2%. The 
optimality conditions show the persistent over-utilisation of quasi-fixed inputs. Our results 
indicate that the inefficiencies from variable inputs have improved over the period, whereas 
those from capital stock remain persistent. These results are consistent may be due to the 
different incentive rates between opex and capex and the Averch-Johnson effect created by 
the presence of rate of return regulation. Overall the results infer the presence of a capex bias 
within the industry.  
The incorporation of environmental variables allows for firms to be considered on a level 
playing field. The effect of adjusting the input slacks for those operating in unfavourable 
conditions improves the efficiency scores of the majority of firms. The environmental 
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variables impact significantly upon capital differences within the industry, thereby reducing 
the magnitude of any capex bias. The implication for policy is that the presence of a capex bias 
leads to intergeneration distortions. A pound (£) spent on opex is fully recovered in the year in which 
it is spent whereas for a pound spent on capex only a proportion is recovered as capex is added to the 
RCV and only the rate of return and an element for depreciation charge is recovered from customers 
annually for the life of the asset. An inappropriate preference for capex reduces costs to be recovered 
and hence lowers consumer costs in the short term at the expense of higher ones for future 
generations. Within the 2014 price review Ofwat aims to eliminate the capex by equalising  
the incentives rate for opex and capex and by earning a rate of return based on a proportion of 
the total expenditure instead of capital expenditure alone. 
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